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1. Executive Summary 
Against the background of MeCoDEM :RUN3DFNDJH³Civil society, political activism and 
communications in democratisation conflicts´ WKLV working paper examines the role of civil 
society organisations in democratisation. The paper particularly focuses on: how the media 
covers civil society activities; how civil society organisations communicate; and the potential 
of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for delivering democratic 
change. Based on the literature review, the following observations emerged: 
x It is not always clear that civil society and the state are playing separate roles or 
occupying separate terrains ² depending on the state form, civil society can be inter 
alia embedded in state structures, working openly with the state, have a limited role in 
demanding services from the state, in active open opposition to the state, or working 
underground and hidden from view. 
x Civil society cannot always be regarded as a democratising force ² while it can play 
such a role, depending on context, it can be violent, and in some instances even 
opposed to broad-based equal rights for all. In addition, civil society groups might be 
focussed on minimalist demands ² not broad or deep societal change. 
x While some of the literature delineates between social and political activism ² where 
political activism is directed at the state and social activism focuses on a range of 
causes, such as environmentalism, gender and LGBTIQ rights, and services such as 
housing ² in the countries explored under this study, activism could not be neatly 
divided into one type or the other. 
x Although there may be variations from one context to the next, the reality of 
FRQYHQWLRQDO µQHZVYDOXHV¶ LQIRUPLQJQHZVSURGXFWLRQ LQ WKH OHJDF\PHGLDPHDQ WKDW
democratisation conflicts (or any other conflict for that matter), are likely to be framed 
DV µHYHQWV¶ ZLWK HPSKDVLV RQ WKH VSHFWDFOH DQG µRIILFLDO¶ VRXUFHV VXFK DV
spokespersons are likely to be given prominence even when their lived experiences 
are not integral to the conflict. Therefore, the underlying causes and complexities of 
civil society contestation are unlikely to be explored in the mainstream media. 
x Though a range of factors limit activist access to the media, the media is not an un-
budging monolith ² at times it is receptive to calls for change, especially if an 
organisation achieves broad support through both media and non-media activities. 
Activists FDQ DOVR GHSOR\ WKHLU RZQ ³PHGLD´ ZKLFK FDQ LQYROYH D UDQJH RI FXOWXUDO
activities and products, including newsletters, banners and pamphlets, films and 
photographs, clothing such as t-shirts, dramatic productions, etc.. 
x While ICTs and social media have risen as prominent terrains where civil society 
contestation can play out, these ICTs do not work in isolation, but in relation to other 
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forms of communication ² including mainstream media and interpersonal 
communication ² so the impact of ICTs on contestation and democracy depends on 
the media, social, economic and political context in which they are deployed. 
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2. Introduction 
Studying civil society and activism from a multinational perspective is somewhat 
tricky, given that models of civil society are not usually a perfect fit with whatever is 
happening at national and local levels, and in some cases, these models are barely 
applicable at all. To begin with, the a priori assumption that every country has a civil society 
may or may not be true, depending how one defines such a civil society, and indeed, 
GHSHQGLQJRQKRZRQHGHILQHV µGHPRFUDF\¶ (Bodewes, 2010; Lind and Howell, 2010), and 
these patterns may also shift and change over time as local political terrains change (Bjork 
and Goebertus, 2011). For example, in some authoritarian situations, while there may be 
civilians, there may be no organised political structures that challenge oppression or provide 
different voices where therHDUHFRQIOLFWVRILQWHUHVW:KLOH³FLYLOVRFLHW\LVRIWHQUHJDUGHGDV
a powerful antidote to the dangers of the all-SRZHUIXO DQG W\UDQQLFDO VWDWH´ (Behr and 
Siitonen, 2013, p.6), the extent to which civil society organisations (CSOs) are embedded in 
or approved by the state may alter the extent to which civil society operates separately from 
or in opposition to the state (Altan-Olcay and Icduygu, 2012).  
To then go on to look at how this assumed civil society is communicating, both 
through the mainstream media and through its own communication efforts, becomes a 
complex endeavour. Models do not explain all the country-level communications patterns, 
and the existing country-level theorisation may be so unique that it is difficult to extract 
common threads and patterns.  However, since communications are increasingly globalised, 
the different country contexts do feed into a global understanding of how communication 
connects civil society and political activists with citizens and with political authorities in new 
ways, presenting new opportunities and challenges.  
In many countries, the ways that political protest is organised and communicated has 
changed rapidly in recent years, not least of which is the hashtag activism of Twitter, 
connecting activists to each other and to other citizens, not just locally but also 
internationally. But again, not every country-level hashtag has had its moment of fame at 
international level, and not every citizen in every county even has access to the technology 
and communications networks to make their impact felt in either national or multinational 
campaigns. 
This paper sets out to explore the nature and organisation of civil society in four 
countries ²Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa² and the ways in which civil society is 
communicating through the mainstream media and through other communications channels. 
The paper does not attempt to go into detailed case studies, but instead aims to provide an 
overview of the extant literature, highlighting key issues for further exploration. The paper 
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explores the terrain through five different sub-sections, as follows: Section 3 explores 
definitional issues and models of civil society and the applicability of these to the four 
countries studied; Section 4 explores what constitutes social and political activism and if 
there is any difference between the two; Section 5 looks at mainstream media coverage of 
democratisation conflicts and models for understanding media coverage; Section 6 explores 
how activists use media to communicate, mobilise support and draw attention to their issues, 
examining different mediums used by activists in different country contexts; and Section 7 
finally, focuses on the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in activism 
and protest. 
 
3. Civil society 
Civil society, seen as a dense network of civil associations, is said to promote the 
stability and effectiveness of the democratic polity through both the effects of association on 
FLWL]HQV
 µKDELWVRI WKHKHDUW¶DQGWKHDELOLW\RIDVVRFLDWLRQVWRPRELOLVHFLWL]HQVRQEHKDOIRI
public causes:  
Emergent civil societies in Latin America and Eastern Europe are credited with 
effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, democratizing society from below while 
pressuring authoritarians for change. Thus civil society, understood as the realm of 
private voluntary association, from neighbourhood committees and religious groups to 
interest groups and philanthropic enterprises of all sorts, has come to be seen as an 
essential ingredient in both democratization and the health of established 
democracies. (Foley and Edwards, 1996) 
&LYLOVRFLHW\LVVHHQWREHFUHDWHGWKURXJKNH\RUJDQLVLQJSULQFLSOHVVXFKDV³WKHLGHD
of rights, horizontal communication, and self-mobilization, and autonomous association, and 
free horizontal communication whereby all social groups are enabled to have their voice 
SXEOLFO\KHDUGDQGWRH[HUWVRPHSXEOLFLQIOXHQFH´6SDVLüS. 
There are of course definitional and conceptual concerns. Definitional issues revolve 
around the scope of civil society ² does it include organisations and associations which are 
not always voluntary, such as churches or religious sects, and does it include political parties 
and trade unions, or should the term be confined to voluntary activist movements? The main 
conceptual issue is the supposed link between civil society and democracy, whether civil 
VRFLHW\ LV YLHZHG DV ³WKH FRUQHUVWRQH RI GHPRFUDF\´ (e.g. Castells, 2008, p.78), with civil 
VRFLHW\VHHQDVSURYLGLQJ³WKHLPSHWXVIRUHVWDEOLVKLQJHOHFWLRQVDVZHOODVWKHOHDGHUVKLS
DQGUHVRXUFHVIRUSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVFRQWHVWLQJWKHVHHOHFWLRQV´(Holm et al., 1996, p.43). 
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3.1 Definitional issues 
Foley and Edwards (1996, p. 39) identify two  ways of viewing civil society in relation 
WRGHPRFUDF\7KHILUVWDSSURDFKSXWVVSHFLDOHPSKDVLVRQ³WKHDELOLW\RIDVVRFLDWLRQDOOLIHLQ
general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of 
FLWL]HQV LQ D GHPRFUDWLF SROLW\´ 'UDZLQJ RQ UHFHQW OLWHUDWXUH RQ SURFHVVHV RI µUH-
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ¶ LQ/DWLQ$PHULFD WKHVHFRQGDSSURDFKSODFHVDVSHFLDOHPSKDVLVRQFLYLO
society as a sphere of action that is independent of the state and that is capable ² precisely 
for this reason ² of energising resistance to a tyrannical regime.  
Moreover, there is also a different strand of civil society thinking which has been 
influential in some parts of the world in recent decades, influenced by Antonio Gramsci, who 
argued that civil society is the arena, separate from state and market, in which ideological 
hegemony is contested, implying that civil society contains a wide range of organisations 
which both challenge and uphold the existing order (Lewis, 2001). For example in Serbia, 
FLYLOVRFLHW\³FRQWDLQVDZLGHUDQJHRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGLQLWLDWLYHVZLWKGLYHUJHQWLGHRORJLHV
political objectives, strategies and tactics, and social values. The  whole spectrum is covered, 
from the extreme right to the extreme left, from most traditional conservatives, to liberal anti-
QDWLRQDOLVWVWRDQDUFKLVWV´6SDVLüS. 
More recently, a special category of civil society ² mediators ² have been posited 
ZKR LQWHUYHQH EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH DQG µWKH SRRU¶ WR EDUJDLQ DQG QHJRWLDWH and secure 
³GHPRFUDWLFRXWFRPHVIRUWKHVHJURXSV´(Piper and von Lieres, 2015, p.15); such mediators 
PLJKW ³UDQJH IURP FHOHEULWLHV WKURXJK WR SURIHVVLRQDO QRQ-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), volunteer and faith based organisations, traditional leaders, gang leaders, networks 
DQGLQVRPHFDVHVHYHQNH\LQGLYLGXDOVLQDORFDOFRPPXQLW\´(Piper and von Lieres, 2015, 
p.2).  Therefore, civil society might be seen quite broadly, as including a range of actors each 
contesting social and political power relations in various ways. 
Moreover, the separation between civil society and the state is not always applicable: 
depending on the type of state, there may be formal institutional, government-created spaces 
which invite civil society to participate.  For example, in South Africa civil society participation 
is inscribed in the Constitution and at various levels of government, with local ward councils, 
participatory budgeting and development planning processes, as well as written and event-
based processes for public comment on Bills and Acts (Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa, n.d.). It has been variously argued that societal conflict arises because governments 
IDLO WRSURYLGHDSSURSULDWH µLQYLWHGVSDFHV¶ WKURXJKZKLFKRUJDQLVDWLRQVRUFRPPXQLWLHVFDQ
actively participate in governance (e.g. Koelble and Siddle, 2013; Kotze and Taylor, 2010; 
Mathekga and Buccus, 2006; Miraftab, 2009) *HQXLQH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LV VHHQ WR FXUE ³WKH
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space for the rebellion of WKHSXEOLFE\ WDNLQJ WR WKHVWUHHWVYLROHQWO\´ (Nembambula, 2014, 
p.149). Therefore, the separation between state and civil society may be collapsed, with 
citizens actively forming part of governance structures. 
And even in less democratic countries, such as Kenya, civil society barely exists 
outside of ethnic and political patronage networks (Bodewes, 2010; Lind and Howell, 2010; 
Mueller, 2008; Odhiambo, 2004; Okuku, 2002; Orvis, 2003) due to a long history of ethnic 
violence and ruling parties making decisions to favour ethnic groups, rather than the general 
populace. In Egypt, prior to the lead up to the 2011 January uprising, only small, micro-level, 
civic associations, and medium-level, professional syndicates and trade unions emerged, 
and these usually worked in co-operation with the state, albeit having limited roles (Abd el 
Wahab, 2012).  Therefore, it is not always clear that civil society and the state are playing 
separate roles or occupying separate terrains ² depending on the state form, civil society 
can be inter alia embedded in state structures, working openly with the state, have a limited 
role in demanding services from the state, in active open opposition to the state, or working 
underground and hidden from view. 
3.2 Civil society and democratisation 
Civil society is often assumed to have global relevance in strengthening development 
DQG GHPRFUDF\ LQ WKLV YLHZ ³FLYLO VRFLHW\ PD\ FRQWULEXWH WR GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ E\ PHGLDWLQJ
between citizen and state, conveying citizens' interests to government, constraining 
government behavior by stLPXODWLQJ FLWL]HQ DFWLYLVP DQG LQFXOFDWLQJ GHPRFUDWLF YDOXHV´
(Booth and Richard, 1998, p.780). However, it is also possible that civil society does not alter 
the shape of the polity much, because political authorities may respond to specific demands 
made by civil society activists, without changing the overall structure of governance and 
society (Booth and Richard, 1998). While Lewis (2001, p. 11) argues that: ³By examining the 
local meanings being created around the concept of civil society in certain African contexts, it 
is possible to see how it has become part of an increasingly universal, negotiation between 
citizens, states and market around the world´ others question the usefulness of the concept 
to understanding democratic forms.  
For example, in Kenya Odhiambo (2004, p.41)  VD\V µFLYLO VRFLHW\¶ LQ.HQ\D LV ³MXVW
another route for individual primitive accumulation without accountability to the civic 
FRPPXQLW\RQZKRVHEHKDOI LWSXUSRUWV WRVSHDN´3ROLWLFV LQ.HQ\D LVVRSDWURQDJHEDVHG
WKDWWKHLQFHQWLYHLVIRUFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVWR³RUJDQLVHSODWIRUPVIRUJDLQLQJSRZHUUDWKHU
than  creating  UHIRUP´ (Okuku, 2002, p.84). This shows that civil society does not 
automatically generate democracy ² it can simply be an alternative process of power 
accumulation, without challenging the polity to become more democratic. 
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In Serbia, civil society organisations are largely disconnected from the grassroots, 
and civil activism is largely a middle-class activity, with organisations having a weak potential 
³WR VKLIW EDODQFH RI VRFLDO Dnd political power and thus contribute to strengthening 
JRYHUQPHQWDFFRXQWDELOLW\ DQG UXOHRI ODZ´ 9XNRYLü S. Nevertheless, the post- 
0LORãHYLü HUD KDV VHHQ WKH ULVH RI µLOOLEHUDO FLYLO VRFLHW\¶ ZLWK D KRVW RI ³LOOLEHUDO LGHRORJLHV
including anti-Semitism, exclusive nationalism, xenophobia and racism´(Kostovicova, 2006, 
p.31)6XFKHOHPHQWVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\PD\EH³PXFKOHVVGHPRFUDWLFDQG  more dangerous, 
WKDQWKHJRYHUQPHQW´6SDVLüS. Some protest movements have the potential to 
WULJJHU ³SROLWLFDO SRODUL]DWLRQ DQG WKXV UDSLG YDFDWLQJ RI WKH XQFRPPLWWHG RU PRGHrate 
FHQWUH« >SXVKLQJ UHJLPH HOLWHV@ WRZDUGV PRUH H[FOXVLYH DQG UHSUHVVLYH SROLFLHV´
9ODGLVDYOMHYLüS. 
7KXV ³WKH YDOXHV FLYLO VRFLHW\ DFWRUV SURPRWH DUH QRW DOZD\V GHPRFUDWLF´ 6SDVLü
2003, p.450), and civil society structures do not automatically lead to democratic imaginaries. 
,Q VRPH FRXQWULHV ³FULPLQDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV EXLOG WKHLU QHWZRUNV RI VXSSRUW LQ WKH SRRU
FRPPXQLWLHV LQH[FKDQJH IRU SDWURQDJHDQG IRUFHGSURWHFWLRQ´ (Castells, 2008, p.84). This 
OHDGVXV WR FRQVLGHUZKHWKHU WKHHPHUJLQJ FRQFHSWRI µXQFLYLO¶ VRFLHW\ LV XVHIXO LQ WKLQNLQJ
about manifestations of civil society that challenge liberal democratic values.  
Glasius (2010) argues that violence is usually most singled out as a characteristic of 
µXQFLYLO¶ VRFLHW\ EXW WKDW H[FOXVLYLVW RU GRJPDWLF LGHRORJLHV DQG JHQHUDO UXOH-breaking also 
count; and that academic debates centre on whether the use of the category is too western-
centric and on whether uncivil society should be considered as part of a wider category of 
civil society. John Keane (2013, p.135) KDVDUJXHGWKDW³DOONQRZQIRUPVRIFLYLOVRFLHW\DUH
plagued by endogenous sources oI LQFLYLOLW\´EXWQRQHWKHOHVVGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQDFLYLO
and an un-civil society, differentiated by a tipping point in the use of violence:  
A highly developed civil society can and normally does contain within itself violent 
tendencies, that is, patterns of incivility or behaviour prone to violence that can and 
do threaten to accumulate synergetically to the point where the occasional violence of 
some against some within a civil society degenerates into the constant violence of all 
against all of an uncivil society. (Keane, 2013, p.136)  
Similarly,  
[v]iolence or non-violent physical resistance has been one way of acting politically for 
those not granted the authority to speak. Such violence ± by contrast with the 
legitimate violence of the state (Max Weber) ± lies at the edge of legitimate politics; it 
LVRIWHQQRWJLYHQWKHQDPHRISROLWLFVDQGFDOOHGµWHUURULVP¶. (Couldry, 2015, p.120)  
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In the South African case, focusing too heavily on the violence produced by 
FRPPXQLWLHV LJQRUHV KRZ LQGLYLGXDO DQG FROOHFWLYH ERGLHV ³VXIIHU IURP HYHU\GD\ YLROHQFH´
caused by their inability to access both services (water, sanitation, shelter, healthcare, etc.) 
DQG³FRPSOLFDWHGOHJDODQGSROLWLFDOV\VWHPV´PHDQWWRSURWHFWFLWL]HQV(Stewart, 2014, p.3). It 
also ignores how communities have often been involved in protracted engagement with the 
VWDWH LQ ³VORZ DQG SDWLHQW VW\OHV RI DFWLYLVP´ (Robins, 2014, p.94), which often remain 
invisible because they are not as spectacular as violent, disruptive forms of action. Although 
WKH 6RXWK $IULFDQ JRYHUQPHQW SURYLGHV µLQYLWHG VSDFHV¶ IRU FLYLO VRFLHW\ WR SDUWLFLSDWH IRU
various reasons civil society may not want to participate in these and may instead invent their 
RZQVSDFHV WKURXJKZKLFK WRSDUWLFLSDWH LQSROLWLFV VXFK µLQYHQWHGVSDFHV¶PD\ LQ WXUQEH
delegitimised or even criminalised (Miraftab and Wills, 2005) ² they may easily be regarded 
DVµXQFLYLOVRFLHW\¶ 
6R YLROHQFH GHPRQVWUDWHV D ³SDUDGR[LFDO FRPELQDWLRQ RI Oiberatory and oppressive 
V\PEROLFDQGSK\VLFDOSUDFWLFHV´(Von Holdt and Kirsten, 2011, p.32). Lau et al (2010, p.13) 
H[DPLQH KRZ ³YLROHQFH LV D QXUWXUHG PDOH DFWLYLW\´ IURP LQGLYLGXDO WR JURXS OHYHOV WR WKH
extent that iW DSSHDUV WR EH D µQDWXUDO¶ UHVSRQVH WR SHUFHLYHG WKUHDWV 6HHPLQJO\ 6RXWK
$IULFDQ\RXQJPHQLQSURWHVW³KDYHWRGUDZRQWKHUHSHUWRLUHVRIPLOLWDUL]HGPDVFXOLQLWLHVRI
WKHSDVW´(Langa and Kiguwa, 2013, p.23) in order to recover their sense of manhood when 
they cannot be the provider because limited economic or employment opportunities are 
available to them.  
As in Serbia: 
[W]hile it is  possible to  argue that resorting to violence marks the absolute boundary 
EHWZHHQ µFLYLO¶ DQG  µXQFLYLO¶ VRFLHWLHV« LW LV HYLGHQW WKDW YLROHQFH«GRHV not come 
from nowhere, but rather is embedded in specific broader political subcultures that 
cannot be denied the status of civil society element. 6SDVLüS  
Often, for example, violence from civil society might be in response to violence from 
WKH VWDWHZLWKSROLFHRUDUPLHVRIWHQEHLQJ FULWLFDO ³SURWDJRQLVWV LQ FROOHFWLYH YLROHQFH ERWK
when they are absent from scenes of mass violence and when they themselves engage in 
FROOHFWLYH YLROHQFH DJDLQVW SURWHVWLQJ FRPPXQLWLHV´ (Von Holdt and Kirsten, 2011, p.3). In 
many countries it is quite common for not only protestors, but also the state to rely on public 
violence and brute force (Tsheola et al., 2014) to negotiate the local political terrain. In the 
2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, state actors were involved in inciting and 
encouraging the violence (Goldstein and Rotich, 2008); in this case then, violent civil society 
can be seen as an extension of ethnically-based state violence.  
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In addition to engaging violently with the state, civil society groups may engage 
violently with each other ² civil society tends not to be a homogenous whole but  diverse 
DQG VRPHWLPHV FRQWHVWLQJ WKH VDPH WHUUDLQ LQ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V ,Q .HQ\D WKH ³ODFN RI D
FRPPRQSROLWLFDOSURMHFWKDVVXEVHTXHQWO\FRPHWRLQIOXHQFHFLYLOVRFLHW\¶VFRQWUDGLFWRU\DQG
often IUDJPHQWHG SRVLWLRQV RQ PDWWHUV RI QDWLRQDO LPSRUWDQFH´ (Lind and Howell, 2010, 
p.336). While the ideal is that in political protests civil society FRPHWRJHWKHULQD³DIOXUU\RI
FXOWXUDODFWLYLW\«UHIOHFWLQJWKHDFWLRQDQGVWLUULQJLW´(Hassan et al., 2015, p.5), as happened 
in the 2011 Egyptian January uprising, it is not uncommon for civil society groups to face-off. 
6RIRUH[DPSOH LQ6HUELD³WKHOLEHUDOFLYLOVRFLHW\WKDWHPHUJHGGXULQJWKH0LORãHYLüSHULRG
ZDV VWUHWFKHG ¿QGLQJ LWVHOI LQ D SRVLWLRQ ZKHUH LW KDG WR EDWWOH XQGHPocratic forces 
HPDQDWLQJERWKIURPWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\DQGIURPWKHVWDWH´(Kostovicova, 2006, p.22). Because 
of the need to engage for civil society groups to engage with each other, in the Serbian case, 
it has limited the capacity of civil society to engage the state (Kostovicova, 2006). 
However when one views violent citizens acting against the state (or other citizens), it 
is clear that groups of citizens acting together to bring about change in the political terrain are 
not an automatic force for democracy. Efforts towards democracy from one group can be 
derailed by the actions of another civil society group, and civil society groups might be 
focussed on minimalist demands ² not broad or deep societal change. Indeed the 
relationship between citizen groups and the state, and the nature of the action taken, cannot 
be understood as fitting into a global civil society paradigm, but instead must be examined 
with an eye to locally-specific circumstances, embodying a range of different perspectives 
and world views ² rather than considering the concept of civil society in purely theoretical 
WHUPV³RQHKDVWRH[DPLQHWKHDFWXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHVRILWVXVDJH´6SDVLüS. 
 
4. Social activism and political activism 
Delineating civil society groups in terms of whether they participate in social or 
political activism is tricky because there is a continuum between these forms of activism, and 
groups may act differently at different times. One would normally associate political activism 
with party politics, and civil sociHW\JURXSVEHILWWLQJWKHµSROLWLFDODFWLYLVW¶ WDJZRXOGEHWKRVH
aligned to political parties or political causes, such as challenging the form of government or 
demanding human rights (Yang, 2009) ,Q WKH VDPH YHLQ JURXSV LGHQWLILHG DV µVRFLDO
DFWLYLVWV¶ ZRXOG SUREDEO\ EH µQRQ-DOLJQHG¶ WR SDUW\ SROLWLFV DQG IRFXVLQJ RQDGYRFDWLQJ D
range of causes that may include equal access to housing and water, the environment, 
LGBTIQ rights, access to medicine, minority rights, etc. (Yang, 2009). The distinction 
between the two types of activism is generally based on where activism is targeted, with 
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political activism conceptualised as activity targeting at the state and political reform (Yang, 
2009), whereas social activism might seek to change society.  
So, for example, in gender-focussed activist groups, those seeking policy change 
from government in terms of the roles of women in society can be seen as political activists, 
while those challenging the roles of men and women in society might be regarded as social 
activists. However, it is possible that one civil society group may take on society and the 
state. So, for example, the Treatment Action Campaign in South Africa targeted the state 
with demands for medicine, but also multinational pharmaceutical companies to make anti-
retrovirals affordable to South Africans. In terms of more conservative civil society groupings, 
as in Serbia, anti-LGBTIQ activists might demand that the state legally reserves marriage for 
heterosexual relationships, while at the same time encouraging homophobia in society 
(Stakic, 2011).  
Literature on political activism provides a somewhat bifurcated picture. On the one 
hand, Western citizens ² particularly the youth ² DUHDUJXHGWREH³SROLWLFDOO\DSDWKHWLF´DQG
LQ QHHG RI ³UHMXYHQDWLRQ´ (e.g. James, 2011), GXH WR SROLWLFLDQV KDYLQJ EHFRPH ³OHVV
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHDQG UHVSRQVLYH WR WKH FLWL]HQQHHGV´ (Vukelic and Stanojevic, 2012, p.388). 
On the other hand, the post-industrial West has witnessed a refocusing of political 
engagement outside of the parliamentary and political party system, giving birth to the 
HPHUJHQFHRIµQHZSROLWLFV¶(Dahlgren and Gurevitch, 2005). Pippa Norris (2002) challenges 
the notion of an apathetic citizenry, citing the swelling of the ranks of social movements, such 
DVHQYLURQPHQWDODFWLYLVPLQWKHVRUVXJJHVWLQJWKDWSROLWLFDODFWLYLVP³LVDVVWURQJDV
HYHUEXWQRZLW¶VGLJLtal² DQGSDVVLRQDWH´(Zuckerman, 2013). 
,Q µHPHUJLQJ¶ GHPRFUDFLHV WKH SLFWXUH LV HTXDOO\ FRPSOH[ ,Q .HQ\D WKH QRWLRQ RI
political parties is very different to Western ideas of political parties because its:  
Leaders and politicians have shifted from party to party and in the process made 
strange bedfellow alliances with each other. Even those who are in opposition now 
KDYH EHHQ LQ HDFK RWKHU¶V JRYHUQPHQWV DQG FDELQHWV DW RQH WLPH RU DQRWKHU. 
(Mueller, 2008, p.200)  
Therefore, it is difficult to conceive of activism in Kenya as being embedded in parties 
(political activism), and with political parties in a constant state of flux it is difficult for civil to 
build a momentum of political activism (Bodewes, 2010; Orvis, 2003).  On the other hand, 
one finds initiatives in the slums aimed at environmental clean-XSDQGWDFNOLQJJRYHUQPHQW¶V
non-provision of services (Wamucii, 2011), which while being usually defined as social 
activism, could easily spin into political activism if organised to challenge the government to 
provide services. The difficulties in defining activism also become clear when one considers 
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³UHOLJLRXV DFWLYLVP´ (Silberman et al., 2005) in Kenya, where for example the increasing 
sacralisation of conflict has led to the rise of al Shabaab, which sees itself as part of a 
³ODUJHUPLOOHQDULDQVWUXJJOHEHWZHHQ,VODPDQGLQILGHOLW\´(Vidino et al., 2010, p.221).  
Under Mubarak in Egypt, prior to the 2011 revolution, CSOs had to register with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, with licence applications turned down for vague reasons, and the 
state having a say over board membership and decision making; thus the state exerted 
powerful control over CSO activities (Altan-Olcay and Icduygu, 2012).  Furthermore, CSOs in 
Egypt were dominated by older men of a higher socio-economic status, regardless of which 
VHJPHQWWKHLUZRUNZDVWDUJHWHGLWDWLELG+HQFH³&62VZHUHVHHQDVPRUHVXFFHVVIXOLQ
UDOO\LQJ VXSSRUW IRU µDSROLWLFDO¶ YDOXHV WKDQ IRU µSROLWLFDOO\ VHQVLWLYH RQHV¶´ (Altan-Olcay and 
Icduygu, 2012, p.172), filling a void FUHDWHGE\WKHVWDWH¶VUHWUHDWIURPZHOIDUHSURYLVLRQLQJ
Arguably then, activism in Egypt was usually social activism, but with the 2005 rise of 
Kefaya, with its discourse on democratisation and its call for Mubarak to resign (Lim, 2012), 
arguably the terrain shifted and activism became more political. However, this is rather 
simplistic, given that oppositional movements in Egypt have been, and continue to be, 
polarised based on religious affiliation ² whether Islamist or liberal secular (Lim, 2012).  
Even in the 2011 Tahir Square uprising, where these religious differences were temporarily 
overcome, it is difficult to characterise the protagonists of the revolt, with some arguing that 
WKH UHYROW ZDV DERXW ³EUHDG IUHHGRP DQG VRFLDO MXVWLFH´ ZKLOH RWKHUV DUJXHG WKDW LW ZDV
DERXW³KXPDQGLJQLW\´(Baker, 2015). It is also difficult to separate out the extent to which the 
sought after changes are simply national regime change, or a contestation of globalisation 
and the political alliances between national governments and the multinationals who supply 
weapons (Baker, 2015). 
,Q6HUELD WKHUH ³KDV  EHHQ D  SDUWLDO WUDQVIHU RI SHUVRQQHO DQG LQIOXHQFH IURPFLYLO
society to the state apparatus: some individuals have moved from civic organizations to 
positions of power, mostly at the level deputy ministers, advisors, or  in  local  and  regional 
ERGLHV´ 6SDVLü  S. This means that former political activists have become 
imbedded in the state, and their challenges, therefore, can be seen as political. 
Nevertheless, as in Western countries, SerbLDQ \RXQJ SHRSOH KDYH ³WXUQHG DZD\ IURP
PDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFV´ WRFUHDWH ³QHZDUHQDVDQG LQQRYDWLYH ZD\VRI H[SUHVVLQJ WKHLU YLHZV
SROLWLFDOFODLPVDQGSDUWLFXODU LGHQWLWLHV´(Vukelic and Stanojevic, 2012, p.388).  Particularly, 
\RXQJ SHRSOH KDYH EHFRPH LQWHUHVWHG LQ µOLIHVW\OH SROLWLFV¶ DQG QHLJKERXUKRRG SROLWLFV RI
VTXDWWLQJ DQG UHFODLPLQJ ³GHYDVWDWHG SXEOLF VSDFHV XVXDOO\ followed by negotiations with 
local authorities in order to reconstruct places, revitalise neighbourhoods, and make a long 
WHUP FRQWULEXWLRQ WR VXVWDLQDEOH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH ORFDO FRPPXQLW\´ âHãLü et al., 2015, 
p.195)$QGLQUHVSHFWRIJD\ULJKWVLQ6HUELDZKLFKFDQEHUHJDUGHGDVµOLIHVW\OHSROLWLFV¶LQ
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fact the LGBTIQ movement was able to link itself to pro-EU activism  and the pro-democracy 
cause in the 2008 elections (Gould and Moe, 2015) VKRZLQJ KRZ µVRFLDO DFWLYLVP¶ DQG
µSROLWLFDODFWLYLVP¶FDQLQWHUVHFW 
Like Serbia, South Africa also experienced a situation in which former activists were 
incorporated into the state in 1994, and this saw a temporary demobilisation of society 
immediately after the end of apartheid (Marais, 2011; Seekings, 2000). However, as early as 
2000 civil society starting organising again to resist the privatisation of public services, 
through organisations such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and Anti-Eviction 
Campaign (AEC). These social movements undertook social activism around provision of 
services to poor communities, while at the same time undertaking political activism 
challenging global neo-liberal policies imposed by the popularly elected African National 
Congress (ANC) (Reddy, 2010). In addition there has been a proliferation of so-called 
µVHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ SURWHVWV¶ ZKHUH LPSRYHULVKHG FRPPXQLWLHV DFURVV WKH FRXQWU\ ULVH XS WR
protest against inter alia lack of housing, water, electricity and sanitation provision, poorly 
performing local systems of participatory governance, corruption and nepotism at local 
government level, etc. (Alexander, 2010; Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Booysen, 2007; Kunene, 
2014; Piper and Nadvi, 2010; Tapela, 2012 and others). What is interesting to note, at least 
in the South African case, is that while several of the issue-based organisations focus their 
DFWLYLVP DURXQG SUHGRPLQDQWO\ µVRFLDO LVVXHV¶ WKHUH DUH DOVR SROLWLFDO XQGHUWRQHV WR WKH
content of their activities. Some of them maintain organic albeit informal links to political 
parties, rendering it somewhat difficult to allocate an unproblematic tag to the scope of their 
activism. 
None of the countries explored in this literature review present a clear case of 
distinguishing between social activism and political activism. Nevertheless, considering these 
terms is useful for exploring the different qualities and characteristics of activism across 
countries, and for understanding the issues which can limit political activism, such as the 
fractured political party form in Kenya, or the religious divide in Egypt.  
 
5. Media coverage of democratisation conflicts 
Before the advent of the modern, democratic nation-state interactions between 
protestors, authorities, and publics were mostly localised, immediate, and direct; today it is in 
the news media that the most relevant part of the mutual observation and interaction 
between protestors, publics and authorities takes place (Koopmans, 2004). Gamson and 
:ROIVIHOG DUJXH WKDW JDLQLQJ VWDQGLQJ LQ WKH PHGLD LV ³RIWHQ D QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ EHIRUH
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WDUJHWVRILQIOXHQFHZLOOJUDQWDPRYHPHQWUHFRJQLWLRQDQGGHDOZLWKLWVFODLPVDQGGHPDQGV´
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p.116).  
Given that contemporary conflicts are increasingly mediatised events (Cottle, 2008) 
the manner in which these are framed by the media is often a subject of contestation. When 
³SURWHVW PRYHPHQWV HOHYDWH NH\ LVVXHV RQ WKH VRFLDO DJHQGD DQG SURYLGH D YRLFH WR
GLVHQIUDQFKLVHGLQGLYLGXDOV´(Boyle et al., 2012, p.2), media coverage tends to fall within the 
µSURWHVWSDUDGLJP¶ZKHUHE\PHGLDFRYHUDJHWHQGVWRVXSSRUWWKHVWDWXVTXRDQGGLVSDUDJH
those contesting the status quo.  
:KLOH SURWHVW PRYHPHQWV W\SLFDOO\ QHHG PHGLD WR DFKLHYH SURWHVW JRDOV ³VXFK
coverage may not be forthcoming unless protesters engage in dramatic and even violent 
action. However, those very actions that attract media attention are often central features of 
VWRULHVWKDWGHOHJLWLPLVHWKHSURWHVWHUV´(Boyle et al., 2012, p.4). Such delegitimisation within 
WKH µSURWHVW SDUDGLJP¶ LQIOXHQFHV  KRZ WKH FLYLO VRFLHW\ JURXSV DQG SROLWLFDO DFWLYLVWV DUH
viewed within the broader public sphere and 2) the communications strategies these civil 
society groups devise in order to maximise visibility and influHQFH ³$QVZHULQJ WKH FRUH
questions about citizen experience in the democratic process increasingly requires 
understanding the centrality of mediated political communication both in the governing 
process and in citizen perceptions of society and its problePV´(Bennett and Entman, 2001, 
p. 1).  
7KH HVVHQFH RI PHGLD IUDPLQJ LV ³VHOHFWLRQ WR SULRULWL]H VRPH IDFWV LPDJHV RU
developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of 
HYHQWV´ (Norris et al., 2003, p.11). Gitlin (1980, p.7) GHVFULEHVPHGLD IUDPHVDV ³SHUVLVWHQW
SDWWHUQV RI FRJQLWLRQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG SUHVHQWDWLRQ«E\ ZKLFK V\PERO KDQGOHUV URXWLQHO\
organize disFRXUVH ZKHWKHU YHUEDO RU YLVXDO´  7KURXJK IUDPLQJ WKH PHGLD PD\ KHOS
GLVWULEXWH SRZHU LQ VRFLHW\ EHFDXVH ZKHQ WKH PHGLD VODQWV ³WKRVH IDYRUHG E\ WKH VODQW
EHFRPHPRUHSRZHUIXO IUHHU WRGRZKDW WKH\ZDQW« WKRVHZKR ORVH WKH IUDPLQJFRQWHVW
become weaker, less free to do RU VD\ ZKDW WKH\ ZDQW´ (Entman, 2007, p.170). While 
³SURWHVWDQGWKHTXDOLW\RIFRYHUDJHWKDW LW UHFHLYHV«>PD\EH@ LPSRUWDQW LQGLFDWRUVRI WKH
YLWDOLW\RIDGHPRFUDF\´ (Boyle et al., 2012, p.3), the goals of protest groups are frequently 
QRWFRYHUHGDQGLQVWHDGPHGLDWHQGVWRIRFXVRQFLYLOVRFLHW\¶VWDFWLFV² usually the more 
extreme the tactics, the less favourable the coverage becomes.  
In unequal societies where both the legacies of the past and present neoliberal policy 
choices combine to limit the choices for full citizenship for many, protest action by the 
marginalised is often framed by the (mainstream) media as irrational and illegitimate, and the 
voices which dominate tKHVHIUDPHVDUHµOHJLWLPDWH¶YRLFHVRIWKHHOLWHVZLWKLQµRIILFLDO¶FLUFOHV
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However, while in Western societies the official voices of elites might overlap, with political 
and economic elites strongly combined, this may not be the case in all societies. In South 
Africa, for example, the black political elite and the white economic elite may not share the 
same interests (Pointer, 2015; Steenveld, 2004); these contesting elites might therefore 
differently shape media coverage. In Kenya, from 1992 onwards, the media was radically 
liberalised and at the forefront of pushing for a multi-party democracy. With more than 100 
languages spoken in Kenya, media liberalisation led to numerous local stations, each 
broadcasting in a specific local language and popular with local audiences. Competing elites 
(including politicians) own and manage these local radio stations  and have been implicated 
in the 2007 post-election violence, as local radio stations with different ethnic affiliations were 
seen to be encouraging inter-ethnic violence (Ismail and Deane, 2008), so that, while the 
media coverage may have favoured elites, the media did not automatically favour a national 
elite. 
International research on the media framing of protests highlights how protests are 
RIWHQ WUHDWHG E\ WKH PHGLD DV ³D SRWHQWLDO RU DFWXDO GLVUXSWLRQ RI OHJLWLPDWH RUGHU´ (Gitlin, 
2003, p.271)&RQIOLFWDQGYLROHQFHLQSURWHVWVPD\EHSRUWUD\HGDVG\VIXQFWLRQDOQRWDV³DQ
LPSRUWDQWYHKLFOH IRUHVWDEOLVKLQJVRFLDO UHODWLRQV´ (Mander, 1999, p.4). Whereas protestors 
PD\KDYHFRPHWRJHWKHUWRDFWFROOHFWLYHO\³PHGLDGLVFRXUVHVZRUNWRHQFRXUDJHDGYHUVDULDO
IUDPHV´ (Gamson, 2003, p.102). Media coverage tends to focus on the actors and actions, 
QRWWKH³VWUXFWXUDOFDXVHVRIHYHQWV´(Gamson, 2003, p.93)7KHPHGLD¶VFKRVHQIUDPHVDUH
RIWHQ ³FRQWUROOLQJ KHJHPRQLF DQG WLHG WR ODUJHU HOLWH VWUXFWXUHV´ (Reese, 2007, p.149), 
UHYHDOLQJ ³WKH LPSULQW RI SRZHU´ (Entman, 1993, p.55). While protests are often viewed as 
³WKH PRVW VXUHILUH ZD\ WR DFFHVV WKHPHGLD DUHQD´ RIWHQ E\ SURWHVWLQJ ³DGYRFDF\ JURXSV
VHHP WR GR WKHPVHOYHV PRUH KDUP WKDQ JRRG´ (Wouters, 2015, p.2). If protestors pose a 
threat to the status quo, they are more likely to receive critical treatment from the media 
(Boyle et al., 2012).  
A recent study on media framing of service delivery protests in South Africa over one 
year, for instance, found that the most prevalent frames in the mainstream media 
HPSKDVLVHGWKH µZDUVSHFWDFOH¶ GUDPDWLF LPDJHVRI WKH WKHDWUHRIFRQIOLFW WKH LGHDRI WKH
µIDLOHG VWDWH¶ DV ZHOO DV WKH FULPLQDOLW\ RI WKH DFWLRQV RI WKH SURWHVWRUV 7KH µRIILFLDO¶
(government officials, police sources) sources topped the list of preferred media sources, 
and the net effect of the framing of the protests was to delegitimise the protestors (Pointer, 
2015).  
Moreover, framing aside, the media can also be selective about which protests to 
cover. As McCarthy et al. (1996) have argued, while protest is central to politics in Western 
democracies it is known to citizens mainly through portrayals in the media; yet the media 
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cover only a small fraction of public protests, raising the possibility of selection bias ± with 
news coverage of protests increasingly subject to the impact of media issue attention cycles. 
A study by Wouters (2015) found that in Belgium, depending on which actors were involved 
in a protest, protest action was more likely to receive coverage, and more likely to receive 
balanced coverage ± with unions receiving the most coverage and the most balanced 
coverage, peace protests receiving a fair amount of coverage, while environmental protests 
received very little coverage and the coverage received was less balanced. They also found 
that while protest received more coverage than other forms of advocacy (for the same 
groups), coverage was more in-depth when non-protest advocacy was used by advocacy 
groups.  
However, there is some evidence that communities and organisations may have 
GLIILFXOW\DFFHVVLQJ WKHPHGLDDWDOOZLWKRXWSURWHVW ³VWUXFWXUDO LQHTXDOLW\ UDFLDOLVHGSRYHUW\
DQG HYHU\GD\ YLROHQFH «  GR QRW HDVLO\ OHQG themselves to spectacular media images of 
KXPDQ VXIIHULQJ´ (Robins, 2014, p.95) 3URWHVWRUV PXVW HQJDJH LQ DFWLRQ WKDW KDV µQHZV
YDOXH¶IRUWKHPHGLD(Barnett, 2003). More extreme and dramatic activities are more likely to 
attract media attention (Baylor, 1996); while the protestors may wish to deploy frames that 
³QHJRWLDWHDVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVRPHSUREOHPDWLFFRQGLWLRQRUVLWXDWLRQ´ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000, p.615), the protesting community is only likely to get media attention by 
KLJKOLJKWLQJ FRQIOLFW DQG FRQWHQWLRQ FRQIOLFW PD\ EH QHFHVVDU\ WR HQVXUH D ³PD[LPXP
diffusion of information about VRFLDO SUREOHPV´ (Tichenor et al., 1999, p.31). For example, 
Tapela (2012, p.75) highlighted that South African communities were deliberately creating 
GUDPDWLFHYHQWV EXUQLQJ W\UHVEORFNDGLQJ URDGVHWF WRDWWUDFWPHGLDDWWHQWLRQ ³PHGLD LV
LQIRUPHGSULRUWRWKHSURWHVWVDQG«SURWHVWVGRQRWVWDUWEHIRUHMRXUQDOLVWVDUULYH´ 
There is no shortage of academic research that has shown a bias in how social 
protests have been covered by the mainstream news media. Koopmans (2004, p.267) for 
example, argued that: 
The decisive part of the interaction between social movements and political 
authorities is no longer the direct, physical confrontation between them in concrete 
locations, but the indirect, mediated encounters among contenders in the arena of the 
PDVVPHGLDSXEOLFVSKHUH«$XWKRULWLHVUHDFWWRVRFLDOPRYHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVLIDQGDV
they are depicted in the mass media, and conversely movement activists become 
aware of political opportunities and constraints through the reactions (or non-
reactions) that their actions provoke in the public sphere. 
In the South African context, for instance, research has shown similar patterns of 
media coverage of social movements (as obtaining in the global North), characterised by a 
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JHQHUDOVHQVHRIGHOHJLWLPLVDWLRQDIRFXVRQWKHµVSHFWDFOH¶DQGLQVRPHLQVWDQFHVSD\LQJ
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHVHOHFWHGYRLFHVRIµOHDGHUVKLS¶QRUPDOO\EHWWHUHGXFDWHGDQG
aUWLFXODWHLQGLYLGXDOVIUDPHGDVWKHHSLWRPHRIWKHµWURXEOHPDNHUV¶(Chiumbu, 2012; Dawson, 
2012; Pointer, 2015; Willems, 2012) ,Q WKHFDVHRI6RXWK$IULFD¶V$QWL-Privatisation Forum 
(APF), for example, the media for several years relished in the personality of Trevor Ngwane 
DV WKH µGUHDGORFNHG UHEHOOLRXV¶ IDFH RI WKH $3) ZLWK WKH UHVXOW RI VLPSOLI\LQJ HYHQ
cheapening complex structural and social challenges that pushed thousands of citizens into 
engaging in the forms of action WKH\ GLG ,Q LVRODWLQJ LQGLYLGXDO µUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶ RI VRFLDO
movements for coverage from time to time, the media are therefore not interested in broader 
social causes underpinning the protests, but rather in the spectacle of it all. Furthermore, in 
undertaking the day-to-day work of a movement ² building solidarity, networking, consensus 
building ² ³PHGLDVSHFWDFOHVDUHYHU\GLIILFXOWWRVXVWDLQRYHUWLPHDQGVHOGRPSURGXFHWKH
NLQGVRIVWDWHUHVSRQVHVGHVLUHGDQGUHTXLUHG´(Robins, 2014, p.98). 
While there may be variations from one context to the next, the reality of conventional 
µQHZV YDOXHV¶ LQIRUPLQJ QHZV SURGXFWLRQ LQ WKH OHJDF\ PHGLD PHDQ WKDW GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ
conflicts (or any othHU FRQIOLFW IRU WKDW PDWWHU DUH OLNHO\ WR EH IUDPHG DV µHYHQWV¶ ZLWK
HPSKDVLV RQ WKH VSHFWDFOH DQG µRIILFLDO¶ VRXUFHV VXFK DV VSRNHVSHUVRQV DUH OLNHO\ WR EH
given prominence even when their lived experiences are not integral to the conflict.  
7KLVµPHGLDWLVDWLRQ¶RISROLWLFVKDVUDLVHGFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHH[FHVVLYHSRZHURIWKH
media, expanding beyond the boundaries of their traditional functions in democracies. 
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) use the term mediatisation to denote problematic 
consequences of the development of modern mass media, with politics continuously shaped 
by interactions with mass media. Drawing on the work of Walter Lippman, they highlight how 
the mass media present only a highly selective sample of newsworthy events from a 
continuous stream of occurrences; events are identified as newsworthy when they satisfy 
certain rules of news values, the selection process is determined strongly by journalistic 
worldviews and media production URXWLQHVDQGWKHPHGLD¶VVHOHFWLYHVDPSOHRIHYHQWVWKDW
are reported defines what appears to be the only reality for most citizens and the political 
elite ± news value criteria such as proximity, conflict, drama and personalisation impose a 
systematic bias upon the media reality of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999).  
The above highlights that there are limits to how civil society actors can increase the 
visibility of their FRQFHUQV LQ WKHPDVVPHGLDZLWKDPHVVDJH¶V VDOLHQFH LPSDFWHGE\KRZ
other actors respond to that message ± what Koopmans (2004) refers to as resonance. Of 
course protest groups also have their own media and communications systems, though 
these do not place their issues upon a national agenda.  
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6. Political Activists and Media Usage 
While some civil society groups may not seek media attention, instead relying on 
face-to-IDFHLQWHUDFWLRQWRDFKLHYHD³SURIRXQGLPSDFWRQDOLPLWHGQXPEHURISHRSOH´(Rucht, 
2004), most civil society organisations seek quantitative mobilisation, with the goal of 
reaching as many people as possible, in order to shape public opinion. This goal is achieved 
YLDPDVVPHGLD$FWLYLVWVHPSOR\YDULRXVWDFWLFVWRHQWHUPDLQVWUHDPPHGLD¶VQHZVDJHQGDV
and receive positive coverage, since activists rely on mainstream media to reach audiences 
WKDW PD\ EH RI VWUDWHJLF LPSRUWDQFH WR WKH DFWLYLVWV¶ FDXVH HYHQ LI WKHVH PD\ QRW EH WKH
DFWLYLVWV¶SULPDU\VXSSRUWEDVH0DVVPHGLDLVVHHQWREH³H[WUHPHO\LPSRUWDQWIRUDOPRVWDOO
SROLWLFDODFWRUV´DQGWKLVLQFludes social movements and protest groups (Rucht, 2004, p. 29).  
While some civil society groups, such as trade unions and prominent NGOs might 
have access to the media, there are usually groups like social movements outside the 
µLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG SROLWLFDO JDPH¶ WKDW GR QRW KDYH PDQ\ RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR PDNH WKHLU YRLFHV
heard. The relationship between mainstream media and social movements has traditionally 
been (and in many ways continues to be) seen as one of asymmetrical dependency 
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993) in that the position of media at the centre of a mass 
communications network gives media a VSHFWUXP RI RSWLRQV IRU µPDNLQJ WKH QHZV¶ ZKLOH
movements have traditionally had fewer options beyond the mass media for getting their 
PHVVDJHV WR ZLGH SXEOLFV 7R DWWUDFW PHGLD DWWHQWLRQ DQG ³RYHUFRPH RU DW OHDVW FRSH
creatively with their asymmetrical dHSHQGHQF\RQWKHPDVVPHGLD«>SURWHVWRUJDQLVDWLRQV
must] exercise considerable creativity in deploying various tactics aimed at reducing 
DV\PPHWULFDO GHSHQGHQFH´ (Carroll and Ratner, 1999, pp.26±27). If these groups are not 
reported on by the media, they remain known only to their own in-group of participants and 
supporters rather than the broad public (Rucht, 2004). 
Activists attempting to enter mainstream media agendas need to cultivate D³FDUHIXO
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQHHGVDQGUXOHVRIWKHPDVVPHGLD´(Rucht, 2004, p.32) if they hope to 
receive positive coverage. Activists attract the attention of media by appealing to 
conventional news values such as conflict, proximity, prominence, etc. to attract the attention 
RI PDLQVWUHDP MRXUQDOLVWV ,Q FRQIRUPLQJ WR WKH µQHZV YDOXH¶ DJHQGD RI WKH PDLQVWUHDP
media, activists will typically be interested in generating media discourses that grant them 
three things, namely: standing (i.e. quantity of coverage that places the movement clearly in 
the public gaze); preferred framing of the issues at hand (i.e. a construction of the news that 
features the terms, definitions and codes of the movement) and sympathy (i.e. coverage 
which is likely to gain sympathy from relevant publics) (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993). 
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By staging protests or rallies for instance, activists confront established holders of 
power in society, and the conflict that ensues is then covered by the mainstream media. 
Demonstrations and protests have often played a crucial role in developing and subsequently 
enacting democracy, constiWXWLQJ ³D EULGJH KHOSLQJ WR RYHUFRPH SRVVLEOH GLVFRQQHFWV
between publics, opinion formation and policy-PDNHUV´(Cottle, 2008, p.853).  
When publics constitute a movement or organisation, they develop collective action 
IUDPHV DV ³DGKHUHQWV QHJRWLDWH D VKDUHG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI VRPH SUREOHPDtic issue or 
situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to 
EODPHDQGXUJHRWKHUVWRDFWLQFRQFHUWWRDIIHFWFKDQJH´(Benford and Snow, 2000, p.615). 
The collectLYHDFWLRQIUDPHVDUHW\SLFDOO\³DJHQWLFDQGFRQWHQWLRXVLQWKHVHQVHRIFDOOLQJIRU
DFWLRQWKDWSUREOHPDWL]HVDQGFKDOOHQJHVH[LVWLQJDXWKRULWDWLYHYLHZDQGIUDPLQJVRIUHDOLW\´
(Snow, 2008, p.385)7KHGLVWLQFWLYHDQGHYROYLQJFXOWXUHRIDPRYHPHQWPD\³FRQIOLFWZLWK
PHGLD DQG PDLQVWUHDP FXOWXUH´ (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p.115), so the media often 
IUDPHVSURWHVWVDV³DSRWHQWLDORUDFWXDOGLVUXSWLRQRI OHJLWLPDWHRUGHU´(Gitlin, 2003, p.271). 
,QWKDWWKHPHGLD³DUHQRWQHXWUDOXQVHOHFWLYHUHFRUGHUVRIHYHQWV«>WKH\@DUHSDUWRISROLWLFV
and pDUWRISURWHVWWKHWKUHHRIWKHPDUH LQH[WULFDEO\ LQWHUWZLQHGLQRQJRLQJHYHQWV´ (Oliver 
and Maney, 2000, p.463). 
:KHUHDV SURWHVWRUV PD\ KDYH FRPH WRJHWKHU WR DFW FROOHFWLYHO\ ³PHGLD GLVFRXUVHV
ZRUNWRHQFRXUDJHDGYHUVDULDOIUDPHV´(Gamson, 2003, p.102). Therefore, in trying to attract 
media attention, organisations face two different battles: first, a fight for media access and 
VHFRQGDILJKW³IRUWKHGHILQLWLRQDQGIUDPLQJRIDFRYHUHGLVVXH´(Walgrave and Manssens, 
2005, p.116). While the media focus on the dramaturgy, it is also true that activists increase 
the dramaturgy in order to attract media aWWHQWLRQ$UJXDEO\³DFWLYLVPLVQRWIXOO\WKLQNDEOHRU
RSHUDWLRQDODSDUWIURPSHUIRUPDQFH´(Hamera, 2014, p.418). Protests often involve singing or 
music such as drumming, costuming (such as organisational t-shirts), and props such as 
banneUVDQGSODFDUGVVXFKV\PEROVFDQEHVHHQDV³KLJKO\SRZHUIXOWRROVRIVSXUULQJFLYLF
HQJDJHPHQWEXLOGLQJVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVDQGSURPRWLQJVRFLDOMXVWLFH´(Singhal and Greiner, 
2008, p.11). In Serbia, at one point, activists ditched the mass protest as a strategy 
DOWRJHWKHU DQG LQVWHDG VWDUWHG ³PRFNLQJ WKH UHJLPH WKURXJK VPDOO ZHOO-planned 
SHUIRUPDQFHV´ (Bieber, 2003, p.84) /DWHU PRYHPHQWV LQ 6HUELD HQJDJHG LQ  ³FRQYR\V
traveling through Serbia, rallies, speeches, open-air concerts, public panel discussions, door-
to-door campaigning, [making] leaflets, bulletins, artifacts ZLWK SROLWLFDO VORJDQV´ 6SDVLü
2003, p.451). 
In addition, activists and protestors may act to frame themselves as peaceful and 
non-violent. In Egypt, for example, the 2011 regime change started with protest on 25-28 
-DQXDU\EXWWKHUHDIWHU LWEHFDPHDSHUIRUPDQFHRI µFROOHFWLYHUHVWUDLQW¶ZKHUHE\WKHFURZG
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³FRQWUROV DQG UHJXODWHV LWV EHKDYLRXU E\ « LQKLELWLQJ LQ-group divisions and presenting a 
united front, curbing the use of violence, and ostensibly conforming to social values and 
H[SHFWDWLRQV´(Saouli, 2014, p.3). This was essentially DERXWµVRFLDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ZKHUHE\
a group of people define themselves as peaceful, in contrast to violent repression by 
government, police and/or military actors. This performance of a united front made the usual 
media frames of unreasonable and unruly protestors impossible, and helped build 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VXSSRUW IRU UHJLPH FKDQJH LQ (J\SW DQG GHSULYLQJ 0XEDUDN RI KLV µV\PEROLF
SRZHU¶(Saouli, 2014). In addition: 
[A]ny snapshot of Tahrir Square during the 2011 Egyptian revolution would reveal 
ZLGHVSUHDG XVH RI GLYHUVH FXOWXUDO SURGXFWV LQ DVVRFLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH SURWHVWV «
[including] signs displaying excerpts of anti-regime poems, makeshift stalls selling 
political books and novels containing anti-regime content, and an extensive use of 
placards with handwritten Twitter hash tags and titles of Facebook pages,  
DVZHOODV³OLWHUDWXUHDQGVRQJVZHUHSHUIRUPHGUHFLWHGFKDQWHGVXQJRUGLVSOD\HGDWVLWHV
RISURWHVWZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQRIERWKUHIOHFWLQJWKHDFWLRQDQGVWLUULQJLW´ (Hassan et al., 2015, 
p.1; p.5). 
Such strategies are a marked contrast to protestors that resort to violence to attract 
media attention ² VHHLQJDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJYLROHQFH³DVDODQJXDJHDPHVVDJH a way of 
FDOOLQJRXWWRKLJKHUDXWKRULWLHVDERXWWKHVWDWHRIWKLQJV«>DQG@DZDUQLQJDWWKHVDPHWLPH´
(Von Holdt and Kirsten, 2011, p.27). But even though other communities may read protests 
in a supportive way and go on to follow their example (Booysen, 2007)SURWHVWRUV¶HIIRUWVWR
exert influence and communicate do not necessarily get read and rewritten by the media in 
ways they would choose. Conflict and violence in protests may be portrayed as 
G\VIXQFWLRQDOQRWDV ³DQ LPSRUWDQWYHKLFOH IRUHVWDEOLVKLQJVRFLDO UHODWLRQV´ (Mander, 1999, 
p.4). Violent tactics are unlikely to elicit media support (Baylor, 1996) or indeed the desired 
support from other political actors. 
Protests are, however, not the only strategies organisations may deploy to attract 
media attention; other strategies may include attempts to shape public debate by contributing 
opinion articles to mainstream media, to establish relationships with journalists, feed 
journalists information or sending out press releases (Rucht, 2004).  
The key assumption in this strategy is that the mainstream media is central to the 
democratic public sphere and to opinion forming, and therefore to deliberative democratic 
debate. According to this view, activists need to engage the mainstream media in order to 
participate in public debate and to shape public opinion. Despite the power relations 
underpinning media access, activists, using the right tools, do have a range of possibilities 
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for challenging mainstream discourses (Ryan, 1991). Activists may have  to play according to 
the normative rulebook of the mainstream media, which tends to be oriented towards a 
societal elite whose interests might diverge from the socially and politically marginalised that 
activists represent (Gitlin, 1980). However, activists can also work to build a collective 
consensus, and as this grows and creates momentum, the media can become more 
receptive to their messages (Ryan, 1991). 
An example of this strategy was when the Treatment Action Campaign in South 
Africa, agitating for the provision of anti-retroviral medicine in the public health sector, 
challenged the controversial stance by the then president Thabo Mbeki, who questioned the 
link between HIV and AIDS. This challenge satisfied the conventional news value of conflict 
and that of elite politics, and as such appealed to the sympathies of a global audience 
through online media as well as to local middle-class audiences. The issue of public health 
was however politicised as a result, which gave a certain one-dimensionality to a complex 
societal issue, for example, ignoring the economic structures that replicated a highly 
inequitable health system. 
The strategy of engaging in deliberative debate is however only possible in societies 
where a climate of free expression makes it possible for activists to participate in mainstream 
media debates. In contexts where the mainstream media are repressed, or state-owned, 
activists have little chance of making an impact on public discourse. The commercial 
imperatives of mainstream media also often militate against the possibility of activists 
influencing news agendas and impacting on public debate about issues that may be 
antithetical to or not an immediate concern of elite audiences. Consequently, social 
movement activists often complain that they are ignored, marginalised or misrepresented by 
mainstream media (Rucht, 2004). 
,QDVWXG\HQWLWOHG³6RXQGELWWHQ7KHSHULOVRIPHGLD-FHQWUHGSROLWLFDODFWLYLVP´EDVHG
on extensive interviews with US-based social movement groups, Sarah Sobieraj (2011), 
H[SORUHV WKH GLIILFXOWLHV WKDW PRYHPHQWV IDFH DV µRXWVLGHUV¶ VWUXJJOLQJ WR EH KHDUG LQ a 
mainstream media system dominated by exclusionary public spheres. She argues in favour 
of devising communication strategies that do not necessarily always rely on the goodwill of 
the mainstream, corporate media for fruition. Some alternative communications strategies 
are discussed in the next section. 
Apart from the politically focussed media pieces and protest, other forms of cultural 
production can also serve to raise consciousness and rally supporters. So, for instance in 
Egypt:  
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[c]ultural producers began calling for a revolutionary agenda well before the mass 
protests of 2011. The ambition of cultural producers to effect political change was 
demonstrated by the formation of the Writers and Artists for Change movement 
around the time of the rigged 2005 presidential elections. This movement coordinated 
with human rights organisations and dissident political groups such as Kifaya 
(Enough) to organise protests and weekly meetings calling for freedom of expression 
and democracy. (Hassan et al., 2015, p.5) 
For activists, while gaining media attention is critical for success, media attention 
cannot be an end in itself. Organisational success hinges on successful mobilisation 
VWUDWHJLHV RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ RZQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQV PRELOLVLQJ UHVRXUFHV WR VXSSRUW WKH
contestation, and developing a good theoretical understanding of the issues that can be 
shared broadly (Ryan, 1991). While a range of factors limit activist access to the media, the 
media is not an un-budging monolith ² at times it is receptive to calls for change, especially 
if an organisation achieves broad support through both media and non-media activities. 
Media, as much as states and government, is a site for political struggle and contestation: 
³>Z@KLOH PHGLD H[HUt a much greater degree of control over the representation of social 
PRYHPHQWVWKDQVRFLDOPRYHPHQWVWKHPVHOYHVWKH\DUHQRWLQFRPSOHWHFRQWURO´(McCurdy, 
2012, p.249). 
 
7. Social activism/protest and ICTs 
Although activists often attempt to impact on mainstream media agendas, these 
media are frequently orientated towards middle-class audiences who do not have a direct 
interest in the issues that social movement activists try to put on the agenda. The 
mainstream media are frequently criticised for being commercialised and oriented towards an 
elite, with a detrimental effect on democracy (McChesney, 1999). In many regions of the 
world, the state continues to capture media agendas, either through coercive measures or 
through direct influence by means of ownership and editorial staff. Against this background, 
activists have increasingly created their own media to not only disseminate information about 
their cause, but also mobilise support for their activities.   
Several iconic protests have come to symbolise the role of information and 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVWHFKQRORJLHV,&7VIRUSROLWLFDODFWLYLVPLQFOXGLQJWKHµ%DWWOHIRU6HDWWOH¶LQ
1999 (Bennett, 2003) and more recently the so-FDOOHG µ$UDE6SULQJ¶SURWHVWV (Aouragh and 
Alexander, 2011; Wasserman, 2011). The internet and ² especially in African countries ² 
mobile phones, have made it possible for activists to circumvent mainstream media to bring 
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their issues to the attention of a broader public and mobilise their supporters. For example, in 
Kenya, as the 2007 post-election violence spiralled out of control: 
A group of Kenyans in Nairobi and the diaspora launched Ushahidi, an online 
campaign to draw local and global attention to the violence taking place in their 
country. Within weeks they had documented in detail hundreds of incidents of 
violence that would have otherwise gone unreported, and received hundreds of 
thousands of site visits from  around the world, sparking increased global media 
attention. (Goldstein and Rotich, 2008, p.3)  
In 2015 in South Africa, university students united around the #FeesMustFall hashtag, 
to launch the biggest and strongest wave of political activism in the country since the end of 
apartheid, and sparked further protests in both Britain and the US around issues pertaining to 
university funding, the out-sourcing of non-academic posts, and the decolonisation of 
curricula.  
There is already an extensive literature around the use of ICTs for political 
mobilisation, and there is little doubt that digital networks can facilitate faster political 
mobilisation, shorter cycles of protest action and encourage new forms of collectivity 
(Couldry, 2015). However, consensus has not been reached regarding the extent to which 
ICTs can create an alternative politics and facilitate substantive social change in the long 
term. Assessments often hinge on the decision of whether to foreground the structural 
limitations of these technologies ² factors such as the political economy of access, the 
nature of the medium that determines and limits the form and style of communication, or the 
agency of its users ² with their creative adoptions, adaptations, and domestications of these 
technologies. Assessing the impact or effect of ICTs, including mobile phones, seems often 
to be a case of either accentuating the positive potential or focusing on the limitations of such 
technologies. The discourse around ICTs for social change is therefore divided between so-
FDOOHGµF\EHU-optiPLVWV¶(e.g. Barlow, 1996; Dyson et al., 1994; Negroponte, 1995) DQGµF\EHU-
SHVVLPLVWV¶(e.g. Morozov, 2011; Roszak, 1986; Winner, 1996). However, part of the 
disagreement between these two extremes arises because of seeing the tools as somehow 
special or separate, instead of integrated into daily life. For example, there is a tendency to 
see social networking sites as creating social networks, whereas social networks exist with or 
without the internet. Social networking sites may enhance or detract from existing social 
networks, but activism through social networks is not a function of social networking sites 
alone.   
So, for example, in Egypt when the government turned off the internet on 27 January 
2011, it did not succeed in shutting down protest: instead it galvanised protestors to take 
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their protest off the social networking sites into their physical social networks, by protesting in 
the streets instead (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011). Many activists, in their non-internet 
social networks, had anticipated the internet shutdown and had organised their social 
networks to respond ² thus even though the internet and social networking sites had 
assisted communication in networks, the networks were already highly organised ² activists 
were not simply organised and mobilised by the internet (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011). At 
the same time, when the Egyptian government targeted Al Jazeera, making conventional 
reporting extremely difficult, much reporting was forced onto the internet instead, as 
conventional media were no longer available as a source of information, and the ubiquity of 
camera phones made it more possible for citizens to collect footage of the protests (Aouragh 
and Alexander, 2011). 
In the early 1990s, ICTs were seen as heralding a new era for democracy in contexts 
such as Africa (Mudhai et al., 2009). This optimism was often based on technologically 
determinist assumptions that the introduction of new technologies would bring about social 
FKDQJHDQGGHHSHQGHPRFUDWLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQE\DGGLQJ³WKHDVSHFWRILQWHUDFWLRQRIGHEDWH
and of the give and take characteristic of a dePRFUDWLFVHWWLQJ´ (Hassan et al., 2015, p.14). 
But it is an open question whether the use of ICTs makes a quantitative or qualitative 
difference to political action ² LQRWKHUZRUGVGR,&7V³PHUHO\UHGXFHWKHFRVWVRULQFUHDVH
WKH HIILFLHQFLHV RI SROLWLFDO DFWLRQ´ RU GR WKH\ ³FKDQJH WKH SROLWLFDO JDPH LWVHOI´" (Bennett, 
2004):KLOHVRPHSRVLW ³DFDXVDO UHODWLRQVKLS«DPRQJVSHFLfic forms of technology, the 
H[SDQVLRQ RI ULJKWV DQG RWKHU IRUPV RI HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO GHYHORSPHQW´ (Christensen, 
2011, p.237), the Egyptian example points to wider causes, which are only enhanced by 
technology. For example, preceding social networking technology, activism in Egypt was 
enhanced by new physical architectural and social organization in parts of Cairo which 
HQDEOHG ³DOWHUQDWLYH YLVLRQV RI VRFLHW\ WR Ee articulated and debated, and collective action 
RUJDQL]HG LQ JUHDWHU IUHHGRP WKDQ ZLGHU VRFLHW\´ (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011, p.1347). 
Another factor in the Egyptian revolution, outside of internet networks, was more blatant 
³YRWH-ULJJLQJDQGLQWLPLGDWLRQLQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQV´ (Aouragh and Alexander, 
2011, p.1346). 
Also important is the notion that communication networks created through ICTs may 
amplify activism by individuals. Participation in activist groups might be changed through 
what Bennett (2004, p.124) FDOOV ³K\SHU-linked communication networks that enable 
individuals to find multiple points of entry iQWR YDULHWLHV RI SROLWLFDO DFWLRQ´ )RU H[DPSOH LQ
Egypt, activists inside the country with internet access were able to connect with activists in 
the Egyptian diaspora, who were then able to translate Arabic tweets and comment on media 
representations of the protests (Aouragh and Alexander, 2011), thus amplifying the global 
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spread of messages, activism and support for the Egyptian revolution.  And indeed, 
³>U@HOLDQFHRQ)DFHERRN<RX7XEH7ZLWWHUDQGQHZVZHEVLWHVDVWKHPDLQVRXUFHRIQHZVRQ
SROLWLFV´ (Hassan et al., 2015, p.12) positively impacted on pro-democracy views, while 
UHOLDQFHRQWUDGLWLRQDOQHZVVRXUFHVKDGQRLPSDFWRQ(J\SWLDQV¶GHPRFUDF\YLHZVZLWKWKH
democracy defined as the ability to make a choice between multiple political parties in a 
democracy).  
On the negative side, ICTs may change the dynamics of activist organisations, 
making it more difficult to coordinate and control collective action and render organisations 
vulnerable to internal transformation and destabilisation (Bennett, 2004). It may also increase 
WKH DELOLW\ RI VWDWHV WR PRQLWRU DQG WUDFN DFWLYLVWV ³IRU WKH SXUSRVHV RI VXUYHLOODQFH DQG
UHSUHVVLRQ´(Christensen, 2011, p.234). In Kenya, following  the 2008 post-election violence, 
WKH PDLQVWUHDP PHGLD ZHUH VKXWGRZQ FUHDWLQJ D ³IHUWLOH JURXQG IRU FLWL]HQ MRXUQDOLVP´
(Mäkinen and Kuira, 2008, p.330). However, not all such journalism was innocent some 
SURPRWHG SHDFH DQG MXVWLFH ZKLOH RWKHUV EHFDPH ³FKDQQHOV IRU ELDVHG LQIRUPDWLRQ tribal 
SUHMXGLFHV DQG KDWH VSHHFK´ (Mäkinen and Kuira, 2008, p.331). While SMSes delivered 
reports of events, they also became a tool to spread rumours, ethnic hatred and threats. 
A further ongoing debate is whether these networked links are sustainable and can 
translate into substantive social change, or ZKHWKHUWKH\DUHµWKLQWLHV¶RUµZHDNOLQNV¶WKDWZLOO
dissipate over time or under pressure. Couldry (2015) questions the contributions of digital 
QHWZRUNVWRSROLWLFDOFKDQJHLQWKHORQJUXQ+HFULWLFLVHVWKHDFFRXQWVRI,&7V¶FRQWULEXWLRQV
to political change for providing thin accounts of the social context within which they operate, 
tending to make mythical claims about their value instead of showing conclusively that those 
QHWZRUNV FDQ EXLOG ³ORQJHU WHUP SROLWLFDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV´ LQVWHDG RI PHUHO\ DFFHOHUDWLQJ
action and establishing short-term loyalties. It is clear that these technologies, and their 
impact on political communication and mobilisation, cannot be studied in a technologically 
determinist fashion, outside of the social and political dynamics within which they operate. 
7KH³PLVVLQJVRFLDO´GLPHQVLRQ (Couldry, 2015, p.610) has been a problem in much of the 
literature in this area. As shown in the Egyptian example, when the technologies are 
embedded in a social situation and social networks that are already agitated and primed for 
action by political circumstances, then ICTs enhance the ability to communicate about the 
protests, but they do not necessarily initiate the protests themselves.  
As far as theorising on the African digital public sphere is concerned, postulations of 
what ICTs might mean for African societies frequently drew on older modernisation 
SDUDGLJPV RI µGHYHORSPHQW¶ D XQLYHUVDO OLQHDr trajectory of progress was assumed to be 
IDFLOLWDWHG WKURXJK PHGLD FRQVLVWLQJ RI YDULRXV VWDJHV WKDW FRXOG EH µOHDSIURJJHG¶ E\ QHZ
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technologies. However, when this optimism proved to be exaggerated, questions about 
access, inequality, power, and quality of information returned (Mudhai et al., 2009, p.1). 
A problem with these discourses seem to be that a central, cohesive theory for 
understanding the intersections of ICTS with older forms of media and other forms of 
communication, especially in transitional and developmental societies, still seems elusive. 
Much of the debate around ICTs and social change, whether celebratory or dismissive, 
seems to be based on a model of media transmission leading to direct effects. Such 
technologically determinist, transmission thinking bears resemblance to outdated 
µFRPPXQLFDWLRQIRUGHYHORSPHQW¶DSSURDFKHVWKDWWHQGWRVHHWHFKQRORJ\DVDPRGHUQLVLQJ
force, rather than turning the attention to the ways in which these technologies are actively 
contextualised and domesticated by African users. Alternative approaches, based on a 
sociological and contextualised understanding of mobile phone use in Africa and its 
convergence with other forms of communication (see e.g. De Bruijn et al., 2009; Willems, 
2010) and surveys from a demand side (e.g. Montez, 2010), are also emerging. It is 
important to bear in mind that ICTs are taken up by people in varied, heterogeneous 
contexts.  
Where the transmission model of ICT use is particularly concerned with issues of 
distribution and access, ethnographic approaches are firstly interested in patterns of use and 
deployment. In other words, the technology-centred model is concerned with what happens 
to people when mobile phones are used to transmit information to them; the context-centred 
model is more interested in what happens to the technology when it is appropriated and 
adapted by people²people who use mobile phones to transgress the boundaries imposed 
by the state, the culture, the economy, and by the technology-capitalism complex itself. 
Approaches such as social constructivism or actor-network theory have suggested that 
neither technology nor society should be taken as over-determining but should be seen as 
mutually implicated (Goggin, 2012, p.11; Mabweazara, 2010, p.19). The domestication 
approach (Ling, 2004, p.26), which focuses on the adoption, adaptation, and integration of 
technology in everyday life as an ongoing process of negotiation, is perhaps the most 
sXLWDEOH IUDPHZRUN ZLWKLQ ZKLFK WR WKLQN RI WKH UROH RI ,&7V DV ³PDWHULDO REMHFWV ZLWK D
SDUWLFXODUVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFHPEHGGLQJ´(Hahn and Kibora, 2008, p.103). 
It is also important to bear in mind that ICTs do not work in isolation, but in relation to 
other forms of communication. These can range from mainstream, traditional media, to 
interpersonal communication of the semiotics of clothing (cf. in South Africa the use of red 
berets by the EFF or caps and T-shirts worn by supporters of social movements, 
(Wasserman, 2007)). In Egypt, it was not just social networking via Facebook and Twitter 
that enhanced communication, but also access to satellite television and Al Jazeera, print 
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media, email, and cell phone text messaging (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). The challenge for 
understanding how activists use ICTs for mobilisation, activism and public debate is therefore 
to understand the context within which they operate ± which includes the broader media 
landscape but also the social, economic and political environment more broadly.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Given that the nature of civil society in different countries is different, and also often 
shifting in response to political changes, examining the relationship between civil society and 
media production (mainstream and alternative) in Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa 
involves being sensitive to both specificity and commonality. The types of civil society 
organisation across these country contexts are diverse, challenging the construction of a 
simple definition, with different types of activism emerging across time. Even as countries 
make shifts towards democracy, gains can be easily lost and recouped, as Egypt has shown 
in recent years. Unpacking the relationship between media and political activism is also 
complex, given that there are a range of activisms including social and political activism 
which also sometimes overlap. 
The terrain is currently extremely dynamic: while the mainstream media may follow 
old routines of news gathering, and may be subjected to both state and self-censorship, the 
new media terrains open to possibility for dialogue and exchange, but also for the spread of 
dissent. New forms of activism also challenge the mainstream media routines, such that, for 
example, the media workers also monitor social media for story leads. And while 
conventional wisdom suggests that the media are hostile to civil society campaigns, the 
frames can chDQJH LI WKHUH LV D VKLIW LV VRFLHW\¶V DWWLWXGHV %HFDXVH WKH PHGLD LV D VLWH RI
contestation, at times, activists can win the framing contest, winning space to put forward 
their vision of society in the mainstream media. Media created by activists themselves also 
contribute to this dynamic environment. 
While the mainstream media may often try to shape our understanding of civil society, 
activism and protest, new technologies are disrupting simple narratives and, depending on 
context, this may enhance democracy. But it is not just the medium of communication that 
bring about changes: these are tools used by humans in society, and the shape of change is 
determined as much by the actions of the state, civil society actors and activists, with the 
nature of communications often shifting perceptions and engagement in the changing flux.  
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